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1 Introduction
Lacking money to invest in their farms, and unable to produce enough income from agricultural 
activities to meet basic household needs, poor farmers are often forced to sell their labor in off-
farm markets [35].  This income from off-farm employment can be a si gnificant source of cash 
for purchased inputs and on-farm investments which can lead to improved yields and make farms 
mo re pr ofitable [42,38,15].  For example, nonagricultural activities contribute up to 60%of total 
rural household income in Indonesia and Vietnam, and 50% in Nicaragua, the focus of this paper
[52].   
According to the World Bank, about 25% of adult females in rural areas wo rldwide work 
off-farm. Many societies that traditionally did not allow women to work off-farm are starting to 
liberalize this restriction [52].The participation of women in labor markets is  important and has a 
major role in agricultural development by enhancing their bargaining power and status, while 
improving  the overall household’s welfare  [41]. Studies from  the  International  Food  Policy 
Research  Institute  [27] show  t hat  wh en  female heads of households have the same level  of 
education, experience, and farm inputs as men, their agricultural yields are 22% higher than those 
of their male counterparts. Moreover, it is widely recognized that women’s education and their 
status within the household are key factors in reducing child malnutrition [27].
This paper investigates the participation of farm household heads and their spouses in 
nonfarm or off-farm activities in Nicaragua using a balanced panel data set for the years 1998, 
2001, and 2005.
1 The literature covering nonfarm labor markets in less-developed countries is 
vast.  There are two key features that distinguish this study from others: (1) the empirical strategy 
                                                   
1 For this study, nonfarm  and off-farm terms  are used interchangeably to refer all labor activities except the ones 
which involve raising crops and livestock, fishing, and hunting.2
addresses the well-known selectivity bias within a semiparametric approach and panel data; and 
(2) a special effort is made to analyze the marginal productivity MPL(shadow wages) of on-farm 
labor activities separately for heads and spouses, following Jacoby [31] and Skoufias [48]. In our 
analysis, we quantify the impact of the on-farm MPL on off-farm labor decisions. 
Most studies in the literature that address off-farm work have focused on households in 
Africa and Asia; little attention has been given to Central America and to the use of panel data.  
Our goal is to further elucidate the relationship between agricultural activities and human capital, 
focusing  specifically on  farm  household  heads  and  their  spouses  in r ural labor  markets in 
Nicaragua. We make use of all three years (1998, 2001, and 2005) of the Nicaraguan Living 
Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS),  which  to our  knowledge has not yet been used  in 
published studies. We  find some  evidence that  in  Nicaragua, development policies aimed  at 
increasi ng agricultural productivity and empowering women can lead to poverty reduction more 
readily than urban-oriented policies, wh ile also alleviating the pressure on natural resources.
The rest of this paper is  organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature to date, 
section 3 provides a brief description of the Nicaraguan rural sector and the data. Sections 4 and 5 
present the  econometric approach and  the results, respectively, and  we  conclude with some 
reflections on the results.
2 Literature review
The literature covering nonfarm work in developing countries is quite rich, but there have been 
few  detailed  analyses differentiating  labor decisions  between  heads of households  and  their 
spouses. Here we cover some of the major studies and findings related to this subject. 
Studies  of  farmer  participation  in  off-farm  activities  in  rural  Ghana, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe suggest that not only do women earn less than men, but they also work mo re. In 
households where wives are more educated, their husbands have a higher probability of working 
in nonfarm activities. In addition, while off-farm labor is positively associated with population 
density and with higher education for males and females, it is negatively associated with age, land 
productivity,  tenure security, and the  cultivation  of  labor-intensive  crops such as  fruits  and 
vegetables [1,11,32,37,38].3
In China, rural social programs, which involve the economic and social participation of 
women through agricultural  extension  orientation, c ultural  activities  and  political  meetings, 
increased the probability of female participation in the labor market [12]. This participation is 
positively correlated with women’s education and household income, and negatively affected by 
family size. In Bulgaria, off-farm experience is positively associated with hours of nonfarm work 
for both men and women. Family size is also positively associated with off-farm work for men, 
but  this  association  is  negative for their  wives. Bulgarian  government  subsidies  granted  to 
farmers seem to discourage off-farm labor for both husbands and wives [20]. 
There are few quantitative studies analyzing rural nonfarm income in Central America.
Corral and Reardon [12] and Malchow-Moller and Svarer [36] examined rural nonfarm income in 
Nicaragua  using only  the  1998  LSMS  data.    They  found that in  areas  with relatively high 
population density where households have access to electricity, water, and paved roads, 41% of 
farm household income comes from nonfarm activities. Younger and more educated individuals, 
as  well as those who face land insecurity, are more likely to participate in  off-farm labor than 
older, less educated individuals or farmers with secure title to their land .  
The studies focusing on Central America pr ovide useful insights but do not distinguish 
between  the  decisions  made  by  heads  of  households  and  their  spouses  regarding  their 
participation in off-farm labor. This study attempts to account for the factors that influence the 
decisions of both heads and their spouses to engage in off-farm employment and agricultural 
labor productivity.
3 The Nicaraguan Rural Sector and Data Used 
After 43 years of military dictatorship by the Somoza Dynasty (1936–1979) and 10 years of civil 
war under the Sandinista political regime (1980–1990), the Nicaraguan rural sector exhibits a 
complex a nd  challenging  socioeconomic  structure  [26].  Approximately 43% of  the  total
population of 5.8 million is rural, and 71% of the rural population lives as subsistence farmers, 
below the poverty line [17]. These farmers face distorted labor and credit markets and a highly 
unequal distribution of land ownership, and si gnificant numbers are landless or nearly landless
[19]. Most of Nicaragua’s rural poor live in the vast dry central region, where natural resources 
are limited and the high population density has led to overexploitation of these resources [26].4
As a lready  indicated,  the data  used  in  this  study  are  from  the  Living  Standard 
Measurement  Survey  (LSMS),  a  nationwide  household  survey  carried  out  mostly  by  the
Nicaraguan Statistical Service (INIDE) with technical assistance from the World Bank for the 
years  1998,  2001, and  2005.
2 The  LSMS  covers a wide range of topics, such  as household 
composition, health, education,  income and  expenditures, occupation, agricultural production, 
and credit and savings, and compiles the data at the national level. The Nicaraguan LSMS is very 
useful for research purposes, because it is designed to follow the same households and individuals 
over time. 
In order to construct the data set used in this study the following criteria were used:  (1) 
access to land (owned with or without title, borrowed, or rented) was not zero for at least two 
years of the survey; and (2) each household was represented by the same head and a spouse for 
all three years of the survey. Data for rural households that did not meet these criteria, along with 
a few outliers for land and income, were excluded. As a result, the final balanced panel for the 
study is made up by 559 households for each year, for a total of 1,677 observations. These 559 
households represent 22%, 20%, and 14% of the total households—urban and rural—surveyed in 
1998, 2001, and 2005, respectively. Table 1 shows the definitions for all variables used in the 
analysis,  and Table  2 shows their means and standard deviations. All monetary  values  were 
converted from Córdoba (C$) to US real dollars (US$) using the official exchange rate deflated 
by  the  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI,  2005=100)  for  each  year  extracted  from  the  World 
Development Indicators (WDI)[51]. 
The geographical distribution of the farmers in the data set is as follows: 50% in the 
Central region; 30% in the Pacífico region; 19% in the Atlántico region; and only 1% in the 
region of Managua. Overall, the annual per capita Total Value of Farm Output (TVFO) generated 
from crop and livestock sales was low, but it rose from US $60 in 1998 to US $115 in 2005 (in 
real 2005 US dollars). The average land holding per capita was also low—2.7 manzanas (1.9 
ha)—and did not vary significantly over the three years. During the 1998–2005 period, only 40% 
of the households in the data set held legal title to the land they farmed; 15% had access to credit 
and 26% to technical training.  Also,   around 85% (not shown) of husbands and spouses were 
                                                   
2 The data can be accessed  at no cost  at:www.worldbank.org/lsms. We  are grateful to the World Bank and the 
Instituto Nacional de  Información de  Desarollo (INIDE)  (www.inide.gob.ni)  in  Nicaragua  for making this  data 
available.  5
self-employed,  working  without  remuneration on  their  own  land,
3 and concentrated  their 
agricultural production on temporary crops, mostly maize, beans, sorghum, potatoes, and cassava.  
The cul tivation of permanent crops such as mangoes, citrus fruits, bananas and coffee was also 
very common, and the sale oflivestock was also an important contributor to farm income. 
Both heads and spouses were relatively young (in their forties and thirties, respectively), 
and the level of education for both was generally low (3.3 years of schooling on average).
4 From 
1998 to 2005 the participation of heads (95% are men) in off-farm activities (wage labor or self-
employment) decreased from 14% to 11%, while the participation of their spouses increased from 
13%  to  19%.  The yearly  average  contribution  from  nonfarm  activities  to  total  household 
income—38%— is substantial.
5 Our proxy for market wages (off-farm earnings) shows that if 
heads were making between US $20 and US $30 per week, their spouses did not make more than 
US $16 per week. For both men and women, the number of hours worked (off-farm) ranged from 
38 to 54. Notice that the difference between worked hours for women and men is not large, but 
there is a higher discrepancy in wage rates. This may reflect the fact that women are often self-
employed in low-wage activities, while men are employed mo re in the formal wage market [13].
4 Econometric Strategy
The econometric strategy followed in this paper consists of estimating separate off-farm labor 
supply equations for the head of household and the spouse. If the opportunity cost or reservation 
wage of working on the farm is greater than the real market wage that a person could earn off the 
farm, then it is expected that no labor would be supplied outside of the farm [1].  If the supply 
equations are estimated excluding those individuals that do not participate in the off-farm labor 
market and using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) only on those who participate, then one would 
expect biased estimates because of self selection [22]. To correct for this selectivity bias problem, 
                                                   
3 The rest are farmers who own land but are working as employees, whether formal or informal, on other farms.
4 The LSMS asks for level of education according to categories such as no school, preschool, primary, secondary, 
technical school, and university. To convert these categories to years of schooling, we followed the grading scale 
used by Corral and Readon [13]. 
5 The LSMSs collect detailed labor information for all individuals over five years old who had one or two jobs for the 
week before the survey. Out of 1,677 observations in our sample only 0.95% of heads and 1.2% of spouses had two 
off-farm jobs  and 2% of heads  and 0.35% of spouses had an agricultural job as primary  and an off-farm job as 
secondary activity (for methodological details about the surveys see Basic Information Document [6]; Ficha Tecnica 
[18]; Informe de Metodologia y Operaciones [30]).  6
Tobit  or  Heckman  procedures  have  been  widely  used  to  estimate  labor  supply  models, 
particularly when cross-sectional data are used [9]. These methods are also likely to provide 
biased results if inadequate or weak instruments are used to isolate unobserved factors such as 
individual ability. However, if panel data are available, as in our case, and assuming that ability 
(e.g.,  managerial skills,  motivation) is  time-invariant, then  it has been shown that traditional 
fixed-effects estimates can properly account for such unobserved heterogeneity [4].  
In this paper we apply the approach proposed by Kyriazidou [25], who developed a panel 
data estimator that corrects for selectivity bias and also controls for  other sources of bias that
arise from time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics.  Thus, consider the following
econometric model:
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it y is off-farm hours of  labor supplied by individual i in  period  t; 
*
it x is a vector of 
explanatory  variables (e.g.,  individual  and farm  household  characteristics); 
*
it  is  the  time-
invariant individual component; and it  is the residual term. Selectivity bias occurs because the 
latent term
*
it y in the participation equation (6) is observable only when the indicator variable 
0  it d , i.e., if a farm member is engaged only in nonfarm activities (equation 7). As in the two-
step Heckman procedure, the vector of explanatory variables it w in the selection equation (7) can 
be similar  to or different  from 
*
it x [25].  The  it  variable  is  also  a time-invariant  individual 
component,  and  it u is  the  residual  term.   T he  Greek  letters  in equations  (6)  and  (7) are the 
parameters to be estimated. Following the traditional fixed-effects approach, the time-invariant 
individual components 
*
i  and  i  and the error terms  it  and  it u are allowed to be correlated 
with
*
it x and it w , respectively.
Relying on the fixed-effects approach for panel data, the strategy is to estimate the supply 
of hours of off-farm labor (equation 6) by time-differencing pairs of observations where dit = dis = 7
1 for t≠s.
6 This method gets rid of the individual component 
*
i  but not of the bias from sample 
selection. To account for the latter, consider a vector  ) , , , , , (
* *
i i is it is it i x x w w     that includes all 
explanatory  variables  (observed  and  unobserved)  from  equations  (7)  and  (8).  Kyriazidou 
emphasizes  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  assume  that  the  conditional  expectation
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if both of these conditions do not hold, then for each time period the individual sample selection 
affecting  i  depends on the vector  i  and on the joint conditional distribution of the error terms
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*
is it it u u  . The sample selection effect can then be stated as: 
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where Λ(•) is an unknown function and F(•) is  an unknown joint conditional distribution. The 
sample selection term λ is now incorporated in expression (6) such that:
it it i it it v x y                      (9)
where vit is a new error term that satisfies the condition  0 ) , 1 , 1 | (    i is it it d d v E  . The major 
feature of the K yriazidou estimator is that for a given individual, the sample selection term in 
equation (9) will be the same in both periods (time-invariant) only if    is it w w  . If this condition 
is  satisfied, and assuming that the error terms  ) , , , (
* *
is it is it u u   and  ) , , , (
* *
it is it is u u   are identically 
distributed conditionally on the vector  i  , then  is it    .
7 However, in applied work those pairs 
of observations— n it w  ˆ and  n is w ˆ in (7)—are not exactly equal. Thus, to implement the estimator, 
Kyriazidou suggests a two-step estimation procedure as follows: 
Step 1. Get estimates for   by using a conditional fixed-effects Logit model [3,14]; and 
Step 2. Use the  ˆ estimates to construct kernel weights, and estimate β in (6) by the traditional 
weighted ordinary least squares (WLS) method. 
                                                   
6 We have  a three-year panel, so the maximum number of differences is three. 
7 For more details about this assumption and proofs, see Kyriazidou [25].8
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where  in  ˆ is a kernel weight that declines to zero as the difference  | | n is n it w w    increases, and
bn is the bandwidth that tends to zero as n→∞. 
The Kyriazidou estimator assumes strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables, which 
might be a strong assumption. Charlier et al. [14] modified the Kyriazidou estimator for instances 
when endogeneity might be present giving rise to the Kyriazidou instrumental variable (K-IV) 
es timator, which is given by:
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To avoid problems of identification due to the nonparametric nature of the estimator, at 
least one variable in the selection equation (7) should be drawn from the participation equation 
(6) and from the vector of instruments [16,3]. 
5 Model Implementation and Results
5.1 Shadow Wages and Shadow Income
To estimate the off-farm labor supply, following our objectives, it is first necessary to derive 
shadow wages and shadow income for the farms. For this purpose, a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for the farm panel data set is estimated using the fixed-effects approach. As mentioned 
before, the main analytical advantage of the fixed effects method is to isolate some characteristics 
that are assumed to be time-invariant (e.g., managerial ability, soil characteristics) and that are 
also allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables (e.g., education, input use) in the 9
mo del.
8 The specification of the production function using Total Value of Farm Output (TVFO) 
as  the dependent variable is: 
TVFO =  f(LNLAND, LNPINPUTS, LNHLABOR,  LN HRonHD,  LN HRonSP, CREDIT, TITLE, 
TRAINING,  RENTLAN,  SONFARM5-15,  SONFARM15-22,  SONFARM22-
31,DON_FARM5-15,DON_FARM15-22,  DON_FARM22-31,  YEAR2,  YEAR3)  + 
ERROR TERM (12)
where all variables are defined in Table 1. Since the continuous variables are in logarithms, and 
to facilitate the computations, a 1 is added when 0 values are present. 
The results of the fixed effect estimates as well as a simple pooled OLS estimation are 
displayed in Table 3.
9 Overall, both sets of estimates produced similar results, and the Fstatistic 
is  significant at the 1% level in both cases; thus, the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are 
equal to  zero is   rejected. A Hausman  test was  also performed between the  fixed-effects  and 
random effects specification (not shown) which favors the former at the 10% level. 
The main results indicate that on-farm labor of the head (LNHRonHD) has a larger effect 
on agricultural production than that of the spouse (LNHRonSP).  However, women might be 
allocating much of their time to domestic activ ities (e.g., cooking, cleaning, childcare) that are not 
included in the production function. Consequently, we should keep in mind that the estimates for 
the marginal agricultural productivity of women might be biased downwards.  The parameters for 
other inputs used to explain the TVFO, such as LNLAND, LNPINPUTS, LNHLABOR, TITLE, 
TRAINING,  and  RENTLAND,  show  the  expected  signs,  with  statistically  significant  and 
positive coefficients. Like Jacoby [31]and Skoufias [48], we found the contribution of child labor 
of sons (SONFA RM5-15) is not statistically significant.
10 However, households with at least one 
son between the ages of 15 and 22 (SONFARM15–22) exhibit a positive and significant effect on 
increase in TVFO. On the other hand, the on-farm labor of daughters between the ages of 5 and 
15 (DONFARM5-15) has a negative effect on the TVFO, and its coefficient is significant in both 
fixed effects and pooled specifications.
                                                   
8 López and Valdez [35] found no impact of levels of education on farm output for Honduras and El Salvador. They 
suggest that the major agricultural activities in Central America are operated under lower levels of technology and 
limited skills; consequently, additional schooling does not contribute much to higher levels of output.  
9 The within transformation is used to estimate the OLS fixed effects model [2]. 
10 The minimum age for legal employment is typically fifteen years [7, 29].10
From the estimates of the fixed effects model, the shadow wage for the head (HD) and 
spouse (SP) and the agricultural shadow income of households are calculated using the following 
expressions extracted from Jacoby [31] and Skoufias [48]: 
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where the βs are the coefficients for the model in (12) and        is thepredicted value of output 
for the i
th farm in the t
th time period. The use of predicted        instead of observed TVFO is 
based on the hypothesis that farmers face uncertainty primarily due to weather conditions [34]. 
5.2 Selection Equations and Kernel Weights
Before moving to the heart of the analysis, we needed to test if off-farm labor supply decisions 
between the heads of household and their spouses are jointly determined [1, 24]. In such cases, a 
bivariate Probit or Logit model provides estimates for the correlation between errors from the 
heads and spouses equations (rho). Here, four bivariate Probits were estimated, one for the three-
year pooled set and then one for each year of the three survey years (1998, 2001, and 2005) 
separately.
11 The hypothesis that rho = 0 was not rejected for the four models; consequently, 
univariate  Probit or  Logit  models  were  judged to be  appropriate  [24] and  we proceeded  to 
es timate  individual  selection and  participation  equations  for  heads  of households  and  their 
spouses.
12
Table  4 reports  the  results  for  the  conditional  fixed-effects  Logit  approach.  For 
comparative purposes, the results ofpooled Logit models are also shown. The dependent variable 
is  equal to one if the individual worked off-farm in any of the three years surveyed and zero if 
                                                   
11 The specification for the heads and spouses bivariate equation followed the same specification used for the pooled 
Logit presented in Table 5. Results are available upon request. 
12 Although the use of univariate dichotomous models simplifies the analysis, the hypothesis that heads’ and spouses’ 
decisions are  made  independently  might  not  be  realistic.  This  evidence  in  the  literature  is  mixed.  Abdulai  and 
Delgado [1], and McCarthy and Sun [38] analyzed farmers in Ghana and rejected the null hypothesis that rho = 0; 
however, Huffman and Lange [24], analyzing U.S. farmers, and Matsche and Young  [37], analyzing Zimbabwean 
farmers, did not reject this hypothesis. 11
he/she did not. In the fixed-effects Logit procedure, it should be clarified that only individuals 
who switched between working off-farm and not working off-farm are used in the estimation [4]. 
The results show that the coefficients for both methods—fixed effects and pooled—are similar, 
with the expected signs; however, more robust estimates are obtained from the pooled Logit 
es timation. This may reflect the fact that only 369 heads and 393 spouses switched their work 
status over the three years and were thus included in the fixed-effects Logit. 
Our results corroborate the findings reported by Corral and Reardon [13] and Malchow-
Moller and Svarer [36] for Nicaragua. We conclude that education and age play an important role 
in i ndividuals’ participation  in nonfarm  activities. More educated heads  and spouses have a 
higher probability  of  pursuing  nonfarm  activities.  The  age  and  education  effects  are  also 
somewhat correlated between partners. For example, as the education of the wife increases, the 
probability of her  husband  wo rking off-farm  becomes positive and significant. As heads get 
older, the participation of their spouses in nonfarm work decreases.
Land titling is an important issue in Nicaragua and thus is included in the analysis. The 
coefficient for this variable is negative in all four estimated equations but it is significant only in 
the  pooled  Logit  for heads. As  land security  increases, the probability  of  working off-farm 
decreases for both partners. Malchow-Moller and Svarer [36], usi ng instrumental variables for 
titling, report similar results for Nicaragua, and they argue that property rights not only create 
mo re incentives for on-farm investments but also absorb labor. 
The  coefficient  for  land  farmed,  although  negati ve,  as  expected,  is  n ot  statistically 
significant. The marginal effect of livestock ownership on nonfarm activities is small but has a 
significant  and  positive  impact  on nonfarm p articipation  for  spouses.  Also,  if  any  of  the 
household members belong to local associations, the spouse has a higher probability of working 
off-farm. For the head, the parameter for this variable is not significant but has a negative sign. 
Finally, our measure of average efficiency (Agricultural and Livestock Sales divided by total 
expenditure on crop and livestock inputs, following Mishra and Goodwin [40]) suggests that as 
farm efficiency increases, the probability that heads and spouses will pursue nonfarm activities 
decreases.
As household size  increases,  the  pr obability  of heads  and spouses  working  off-farm 
increases; but as long as there are children under five years of age in the household, it is less 
likely that heads will engage in nonfarm activities. For spouses, this variable is not statistically 12
significant. Remittances of any origin are an important source of nonlabor income for Nicaragua 
and  are  considered here.  The si gn of this coefficient  is  negative, as  expected, but  it  is  not 
statistically significant. 
The  Nicaraguan  rural sector is densely populated,  with  mo re  than six  individuals per 
household  on  average.  We  tried  to  capture  how  teenagers  and  adult  children—males  and 
females—who are  living  in the household  and  are  also  working  either  in  on-farm  or  off-
activities—might affect their parents’ decisions to work in the off-farm market. The results are 
mixed  and should  be interpreted  with  caution because  of potential  endogeneity  between the 
decisions of sons and daughters and those of their parents, an issue that is beyond the scope of 
this analysis.
13 The estimates suggest that for households that have at least one son between 5 and 
31  years old working on-farm, there is a lower probability that the head of the household will 
work in nonfarm activities. On the other hand, if one son in this age bracket is working off-farm, 
then it i s more likely that his parents will also work off-farm. Similar results were observed for 
the coefficients for daughters.
The  next step is to calculate  the  kernel  density  weights  required  for  the  Kyriazidou 
es timator. These weights are calculated from the estimates of the conditional Logit fixed effects 
mo del for both the head and spouse equations. A Gaussian kernel was used and the choice of the 
bandwidth (.07 for the husband equation and .08 for the wife equation) is based on Silverman’s 
Ga ussian kernel rule [46]. Kyriazidou [25], Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina [16], and Charlier
et al. [14] used the plug-in procedure proposed by Horowitz [23]; however, as is the case with the 
findings reported by Askildsen et al. [3], the use of different bandwidths in our analysis had 
almost no effect on the final estimates.
5.3 Participation Equations
To avoid the simultaneity between labor supply and market wages, we used the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach calculated in a two-stage weighted least squares (2WLS) procedure [9]. 
First,  the  wage  equations  ar e  estimated  se parately  for  heads  and  spouses,  using  the  same 
Kyriazidou (K) estimator showed in equation (10). Then, off-farm labor supply equations are 
                                                   
13 Similarly, for India, Skoufias [47] did not analyze work joint decisions  among household members, and he also 
estimated separate  functions  for time  allocated to market  work, home production, school  and leisure  for  male  and 
fem ale adults, and boys and girls.13
es timated using the predicted wages generated from the first step and with market wages. The 
results for  the wage equations  for both  head  and spouse  are  given  in  Table  5.  Education, 
experience—calculated as age minus years of schooling minus six [39]— and land were chosen 
as  instruments. In both head and spouse functions, the coefficients for education and experience 
have the expected signs and are significant at the 10% level. Education is more important for the 
head, while experience is more relevant for spouses. The coefficient for land is positive and 
significant for heads, which might suggest that larger landowners might be exerting market power 
in determining  nonfarm  wages  [1]. A Wu-Hausman  test performed  individually  and  jointly 
confirms that market wages for heads and spouses are indeed endogenous. The Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions [10] is  also performed individually and jointly, and it confirms that 
the instruments employed are valid. 
Table 6 reports the results for the off-farm labor supply equations, estimated separately 
for the heads of households (columns 2 and 4) and their spouses (columns 6 and 8) using the 
Kyriazidou estimator adjusting for endogeneity (K-IV) and without adjusting for the endogeneity 
(K). The dependent variable is the logarithm of weekly hours worked off-farm regressed on head 
and spouse characteristics plus farm characteristics and a set of control variables for sons and 
daughters working on- or off-farm. Overall, the F statistic is significant for each of the four 
mo dels estimated at the 5% level or lower. A Hausman-type test (last row of Table 6) comparing 
the kernel weighted regression with the same regression without weights did not reject the null 
hypothesis of no selectivity for the four estimated equations.
Two of the main coefficients of interest—shadow wages and shadow income—exhibit the 
expected signs and are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
14 The estimates clearly 
suggest that the impact of own-shadow wage is higher for the spouse than for the head. The 
negative signs for these coefficients imply that both the head and spouse allocate less labor to 
nonfarm activities as the opportunity cost for agricultural work goes up. The cross-shadow wage 
effect also suggests that when the shadow wage of the spouse goes up, heads reduce the hours 
worked off-farm. Similarly, for both equations estimated for spouses (K and K-IV), although the 
shadow wage fo r the head is negative, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Holding 
                                                   
14 Jacoby [31] proposes a test for the validity of the perfect market assumption using shadow and market wages. The 
procedure is to re gress Wshadowages =  α + βWmarket+ε and test the  null hypothesis Ho: α = 0 and β=1. We strongly 
rej ected H 0, i.e., that the opportunity costs of heads of households and spouses are equal to their off-farm market 
wages. The results of this test are displayed in Table 7. 14
everything else constant, when shadow income goes up, heads work less in off-farm activities. In 
the equations for spouses, these coefficients are negative but not significant.  
The shadow wage and shadow income approach to explain labor supply has been widely 
used and has produced mixed results. Jacoby [31], Skoufias [48], Barrett et al. [5], and Le [34] 
have all regressed hours of labor by aggregating on-farm, off-farm, and housework activities. 
Here we used observations for farmers who allocated hours to either on-farm or off-farm. It 
should be kept in mind that if either the head or the spouse or both worked off-farm continuously 
for the three years surveyed, then this implies that their household’s agricultural MPL is  zero. In 
our  sample,  however,  only two such  cases  were observed; and these observations  we re not 
discarded because their family shadow income was positive.
As described before, weekly earnings were used as a proxy for market wages taken as 
exogenous (K estimator) and endogenous (K-IV estimator) for both heads and spouses. For the 
heads, the coefficients for own-wage and cross-wage effects produced mixed results. The first 
result (column 2 in Table 6),  which assumes that market wages are exogenous, suggests that 
when the off-farm wage of the household head increases, hours dedicated to off-farm labor also 
increase.  On  the  other  hand,  under t he  instrumental  variable  method, the  results  suggest  a 
backward-bending labor supply behavior for heads: if wages rise beyond a certain point, heads 
work less implying that the income effect dominates the substitution effect [44]. This backward 
bend occurs  if  the spouse’s wages increase beyond a  certain point, as well.  For  the spouse 
equations, the own-wage effect was positive but this parameter was significant only for the K 
es timator. The cross-wage effect was positive only for the K-IV estimator, suggesting that as the 
wage of heads increases, spouses increase their off-farm labor supply.  Skoufias [47] found that in 
India, when male wages increase, there is a reduction of hours worked both in the market and at 
home, while hours allocated to leisure go up.  On the other hand, as female wages increase, work 
at both the market and thehome rises while leisure time goes down.  
The educational level of spouses seems to have a positive and significant effect on total
hours of off-farm work by heads of households, but the head’s education does not have any effect 
on the spouse’s off-farm work hours. In all four models estimated, age increases off-farm labor 
supply at a decreasing rate, as expected. In addition, livestock ownership, remittances, and the
presence of children under five years old in the household are negatively correlated with off-farm 15
work. More robust results for these variables were obtained under the IV estimation but only for 
the head equation. 
A large set of control variables was used to verify how female and male teenagers and 
adult children who  wo rk  on- or off-farm  might  affect  the  off-farm  labor of heads  and  their 
spouses.  The  results  for the head and spouse equations, instrumented or  not, show  that the 
es timates do not differ substantially; nevertheless, mo re robust results are observed for the K-IV 
es timation for heads.  Overall, the signs of the coefficients are quite similar to those obtained in 
the selection equation.  
In summary, if the household has at least one son or daughter between the ages of 5 and 
31 working on-farm, the head of household works less in nonfarm activities. However, if there is 
at least one daughter between the ages of 15 and 22 working on-farm, the head of household will 
work more off-farm. Interestingly, the spouse equation captures more of the influence of children 
working if they are female. Again, these results should be interpreted with caution because as 
with the selection equations, simultaneity regarding to labor decisions between heads and spouses 
with their children was not considered, an issue left for future analysis.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on off-farm labor supply in the rural sector of 
Nicaragua using panel data to undertake separate analyses for the household head and the spouse.  
For this purpose, we refined the empirical approach introduced by Jacoby [31] and Skoufias [48] 
to estimate shadow  wages  and shadow  income. We  also  applied  a semiparametric  approach 
specific to panel data which eliminates biases not only from some of the key individual and farm 
time-invariant characteristics but also from sample selection.  The sample selection problem is a 
key concern in the labor supply literature and thus needs to be carefully handled in applied wok. 
Our main findings suggest that the shadow wages and shadow income of household heads 
and their spouses play a major role in the supply of labor to nonfarm activities. Specifically, when 
the marginal productivity of on farm agricultural work goes up, there is a reduction of hours 
allocated to nonfarm activities. This result lends support to the hypothesis that policy efforts
designed to increase farm productivity and output growth among peasant farmers maybe more 16
effective in alleviating  rural poverty than urb an-oriented development strategies. Although this 
hypothesis  deserves  fu rther  investigation,  it  might  provide  some  evidence for  the old  idea
formalized  by Johnston and Mellor [33] that agricultural productivity growth is an  essential 
component of any development strategy [52]. Moreover, within this strategy, recently there is 
increasi ng pressure on multilateral organizations as well as private foundations to provide more 
assistance to developing country agriculture particularly as we witness growing  challenges in 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals [50].  
Like  other  researchers  in  the  field,  we  also  found  that  education,  age,  remittances, 
household  size,  and sons  and  daughters  working are  related  to  off-farm  labor supply,  with 
significant differences between their effects on heads and spouses. Finally, we find that in a 
densely populated rural sector located in highly degraded areas, as is the case in Nicaragua and 
mu ch  of  Central America, public support based on  investments for agricultural  research and 
extension should  be seen  as a means not only to promote  productivity  growth and poverty 
alleviation but also as a means to develop more environmentally sustainable production processes 
to improve the quality of life and livelihood for rural communities [43].17
Table 1Variable Definitions
Farm Characteristics
TVFO Total value of  farm output (crop and livestock sales) in dollars/year
LAND Owned and rented land in manzanas
RENTLAND 1 if household rents land
TITLE 1 if the household has legal title to at least some of the land farmed
LIVT_ASSET Livestock assets in dollars/year
PINPUTS Total expenditure variable inputs in dollars/year (seeds, fertilizers, etc.)
HLABOR Total expenditure on hired labor in dollars/year
CREDIT 1 if household receives credit for farm production
TRAINING 1 if household receives technical assistance
ORGANIZA 1 if household participates in farmer organizations
EFFICIENCYa Agricultural and livestock Sales divided by total crop and livestock variable inputs
Household Characteristics
HHSIZE Number of household members
CHILD = < 5 1 if household has at least one child less than 5 years old
REMITTANCES Remittances in dollars/year
Head and Spouse Characteristics
Head
AGEHD Age
EDUCHD Years of schooling
OFFHD 1 if works off-farm
WGoffHD Weekly off f arm wage in dollars
HRoffHD Weekly hours worked off farm in dollars
HRonHD Weekly hours worked on farm in dollars
Spouse
AGESP Age
EDUCSP Years of schooling
OFFSP 1 if works off-farm
WGoffSP Weekly off farm wage in dollars
HRoffSP Weekly hours worked off farm in dollars
HRonSP Weekly hours worked on farm in dollars
Young and Adult Children Working
Son
SonFARM 5 - 15 1 if at least one male child between 6 and 14 years old is working on farm
SonFARM 15 - 22 1 if at least one male child between 15 and 21 years old is wor king on farm
SonFARM 22 - 31 1 if at least one male child between 22 and 31 years old is working on farm
SoffFARM 5 - 15 1 if at least one male child between 6 and 14 years old is working off  farm
SoffFARM 15 - 22 1 if at least one male child between 15 and 21 years old is wor king off  farm
SoffFARM 22 - 31 1 if at least one male child between 22 and 31 years old is working off  farm
Daughter
DonFARM 5 - 15 1 if at least one female child between 6 and 14 years old is working on farm
DonFARM 15 - 22 1 if at least one female child between 15 and 21 years old is working on farm
DonFARM 22 - 31 1 if at least one female child between 22 and 31 years old is working on f arm
DoffFARM 5 - 15 1 if at least one female child between 6 and 14 years old is working off  farm
DoffFARM 15 - 22 1 if at least one female child between 15 and 21 years old is working off  farm
DoffFARM 22 - 31 1 if at least one female child between 22 and 31 years old is working off  farm
Geographic Characteristics
MANAGUA 1 if resides in Managua region
PACIFICO 1 if resides in Pacífico region
CENTRAL 1 if resides in Central region
ATLANTICO 1 if resides in Atlántico region
aIndicator based on Mishra and Goodwin [47]18
Table 2Sample Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations by Year
1998 2001 2005
Farm Characteristics Means SD Means SD Means SD
TV FO
a 60.03 194.93 82.39 415.97 115.48 241.85
LAND
a 2.79 7.86 2.77 9.57 2.68 6.24
RENTLAND
a 0.01 0.08 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49
PINPUTS
a 8.32 18.308 15.47 37.79 12.86 28.92
HLABORa 3.44 20.81 0.299 2.26 0.50 1.86
LIVT_ASSET
a 110.65 495.64 140.81 528.99 228.28 679.52
TI TLE 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.47 0.50
CREDIT 0.17 0.38 0.10 0.30 0.26 0.44
TRAINING 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.24
ORGANIZA 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.26 0.44
EFFICIENCY 7.77 67.99 7.79 22.12 12.19 24.48
Household Characteristics
HHSIZE 6.48 2.98 6.53 2.84 6.41 2.81
CHILD5 =<5 0.72 0.45 0.60 0.49 0.50 0.50
REMITTANCES
a 1.83 9.25 13.63 51.24 2.38 7.57
Young and Adult Children Working
Son
SonFARM 5 - 15 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36
SonFARM 15 - 22 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.45 0.30 0.46
SonFARM 22 - 31 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.34
SoffFARM 5 - 15 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11
SoffFARM 15 - 22 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16
SoffFARM 22 - 31 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17
Daughter
DonFARM 5 - 15 0.28 0.45 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13
DonFARM15 - 22 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
DonFARM 22 - 31 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07
DoffFARM 5 - 15 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12
DoffFARM 15 - 22 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.20
DoffFARM 22 - 31 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20
Geographic Characteristics
MANAGUA 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13
PACIFICO 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
CENTRAL 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
ATLANTICO 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
Head Characteristics
AGEHD 43.64 14.79 46.34 14.72 49.34 14.60
EDUCHD 3.30 3.40 3.47 3.40 3.48 3.59
OFFHD 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31
WGoffHD 17.77 16.51 24.39 16.57 32.22 21.70
HRoffHD 46.41 18.16 45.72 19.63 54.03 17.25
HRonHD 33.66 15.48 38.62 18.33 41.65 15.05
Spouse Characteristics
AGESP 35.76 15.72 38.74 15.66 44.11 13.71
EDUCSP 3.16 3.32 3.23 3.34 3.59 3.50
OFFSP 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.36 0.19 0.40
WGoffSP 11.48 9.69 16.18 10.51 16.98 16.46
HRoffSP 40.07 16.96 39.64 24.04 38.74 20.63
HRonSP 4.05 12.20 4.07 11.78 5.23 13.38
a In per capita terms19
Table  3Agricultural Production Function Estimates
Dependent  Variable: 
LNTVFO





LNLAND 0.2711*** (0.103) 0.218*** (0.055)
LNPINPUTS 0.4943*** (0.041) 0.553*** (0.034)
LNHLABOR 0.252*** (0.074) 0.333*** (0.056)
LNHRonHD 0.2519*** (0.048) 0.242*** (0.034)
LNHRonSP 0.1020 (0.067) 0.104** (0.050)
CREDIT 0.219 (0.163) 0.203 (0.132)
TITLE 0.8414*** (0.166) 0.672*** (0.133)
TRAINING  0.4518** (0.215) 0.374** (0.176)
RENTLAND 0.6927*** (0.173) 0.498*** (0.144)
Young and Adult Children Working On-Farm
Son
SonFARM 5 - 15 0.0617 (0.15) 0.144 (0.129)
SonFARM 15 - 22 0.47*** (0.158) 0.407*** (0.121)
SonFARM 22 - 31 -0.093 (0.234) -0.113 (0.180)
Daughter
DonFARM 5 - 15 -0.513** (0.227) -0.352* (0.203)
DonFARM 15 - 22 -0.143 (0.26) 0.245 (0.267)
DonFARM 22 - 31 -0.21 (0.41) -0.339 (0.367)
Geographic Characteristics
PACIFICO - - 0.46 (0.464)
CENTRAL - - 0.722 (0.461)
ATLANTICO - - 1.41*** (0.471)
DUMYEAR2 0.0063 (0.15) 0.185 (0.146)
DUMYEAR3 0.60*** (0.15) 0.784*** (0.152)







* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
a Robust standard errors20
Table 4Head and Spouse Participation Equations: Conditional Fixed Effects Logit and Pooled Logit
Dep Var: 1 if work 
off-farm
Head Spouse












EDUCHD 0.1524 (0.236) .00313 0.286*** (0.070) -0.181 (0.203) -.00015 -0.013 (0.052)
AGEHD 0.1610** (0.075) .00328 0.139*** (0.052) -0.021 (0.035) -.000016 -0.0312*** (0.011)
AGEHD2 -0.0024** (0.001) -.00005 -0.0017*** (0.0006) - - - -
Spouse Characteristics
EDUCSP 0.319* (0.208) .00672 0.1028* (0.060) 0.322*** (0.127) .00050 0.122*** (0.055)
AGESP -0.0043 (0.030) -.00009 -0.0065 (0.010) 0.201 (0.151) .00015   0.146*** (0.035)
AGESP2 - - - - -0.0016 (0.001) -1.2e-06   -0.0013*** (0.0004)
Farm Characteristics
TITLE -0.3480 (0.437) -.00757 -0.7892*** (0.229) -0.038 (0.412) -.000011   -0.123 (0.169)
LAND -0.0305 (0.027) -.000622  -0.0061 (0.004) 0.0066 (0.008) 5.58e-06 -0.004 (0.004)
LIVT_ASSET 0.00021* (0.0001) 4.3e-06 -0.00001 (0.0001) -0.00003 (0.0001) -2.3e-08 0.00002** (0.0004)
TRAINING  0.864 (0.783) .0128461 0.1414 (0.349) 0.169 (0.622) .00014   0.21 (0.252)
ORGANIZATION -0.2603 (0.631) -.00549   -0.0911 (0.339) 0.8244* (0.466) .00051 0.50** (0.223)
EFFICIENCY  -0.0611** (0.024) -.001273  -0.0466*** (0.016) -0.032* (0.015) -.00002 -0.011** (0.005)
Household Characteristics
HHSIZE 0.279** (0.130) .00582 0.1069*** (0.041) 0.098 (0.090) .000078   -0.10** (0.041)
CHILD=< 5 -0.346 (0.458) -.00650 -0.3912** (0.210) 0.034 (0.385) .000027 0.019 (0.184)
REMITTANCES -0.0059 (0.004) -.00012  -0.004 (0.002) -0.0011 (0.0010) -7.4e-07 -0.0008 (0.009)
Young and Adult Children Working
Son
SonFARM 5 - 15 -1.465** (0.600) -.05409 -1.0699*** (0.315) -0.1303 (0.441) -.00004 -0.108 (0.213)
SonFARM 15 - 22 -1.333** (0.611) -.0430 -0.7323*** (0.272) 0.0205 (0.445) .00001 -0.383* (0.205)
SonFARM 22 - 31 -2.53** (1.105) -.17458 -1.2399** (0.550) 0.428 (0.623) .000301 -0.0034 (0.280)
SoffFARM 5 - 15 1.541** (0.699) .01817 1.7503*** (0.356) 3.33*** (0.762) .00095 3.002*** (0.389)
SoffFARM 15 - 22 5.209*** (1.514) .03454 2.3947*** (0.393) 1.40** (0.662) .00065 1.12*** (0.355)
SoffFARM 22 - 31 0.639 (0.964) .01031 0.459 (0.538) 2.14** (0.991) .00076   0.85* 0.476)
Daughter
DonFARM 5 - 15 -2.744*** (0.988) -.19790 -1.7359*** (0.456) 0.374 (0.563) .00025 0.011 (0.299)
DonFARM 15 - 22 -2.6205 (3.063) -.19953 -0.9602 (0.627) 1.473 (1.21) .00064  0.404 (0.389)
DonFARM 22 - 31 -3.012 (2.293) -.28778 -1.9425* (1.165) -0.657 (0.765)   -.00063        0.242 (0.597)
DoffFARM 5 - 15 1.904** (1.003) .0202 1.5008*** (0.356) 3.848*** (0.741) .00103 3.11*** (0.386)
DoffFARM 15 - 22 1.009 (0.905) .0143     0.5256 (0.383) 0.851 (1.055) .00046 0.715** (0.336)
DoffFARM 22 - 31 4.317 (2.981) .02441  0.7439 (0.529) 0.283 (0.655) .00020 0.036 (0.467)
Geographic Characteristics
PACIFICO - - -1.2149** (0.608) - - 0.7736 0.698)
CENTRAL - - -2.189*** (0.618) - - 0.786 0.691)
ATLANTICO - - -1.520** (0.636) - - 0.445 0.706)
DUM_YEAR2 0.226 (0.417) .00482 -0.020 (0.272) 1.7438*** (0.511) .00120 1.26*** 0.2629)
DUM_YEAR3 0.6407 (0.610) .01242 -0.15 (0.294) 1.958*** (0.637) .00134    1.31*** 0.2693)
CONSTANT - - -3.027** (1.221) - - -5.51*** 1.0637)




Wald chi2(28)  56.63***
Log likelihood -73.071 -421.8 0    -92.11 -577.94
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
a Robust standard errors
bMarginal Effects21
Table  5  Head and Spouse Off-Farm Wage Equations: Kyriazidou Estimates






EDUCHD 1.595* (0.875) - -
EXPERHD 1.83** (0.671) - -
EXPERHD2 -0.023*** (0.008) - -
EDUCSP - - 1.691* (1.03)
EXPERSP - - 0.391* (0.235)
EXPERSP2 - - -0.010** (0.0052)
LAND 0.137** (0.07) -0.018 (0.020)
HHSIZE 0.21 (0.542) 0.10 (0.426)
LIVT_ASSET -0.0013* (0.001) -0.0002 (0.0003)





* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
aStandard Errors in parenthesis22
Table 6 Head and Spouse Off-Farm Labor Supply Equations: Kyriazidou Estimates
Dep  Var:  Logarithm 
of  weekly  hours 
worked off-Farm
Head Spouse







WGoffHD 0.0716*** (0.0106) -0.077*** (0.027) 0.00035 (0.0052) 0.0346** (0.0122)
SHAWAGEHD -0.0032 (0.0173) -1.267** (0.531) -0.046 (0.3223) -0.049 (0.3141)
AGEHD 0.0142 (0.0510) 0.018 (0.0589) -0.0210 (0.0148) -0.0111 (0.0142)
AGEHD 2 0.00002 (0.0005) -0.0002 (0.0006) - - - -
EDUCHD 0.0939 (0.0716) 0.116 (0.0846)
Spouse Characteristics
WGoffSP -0.0264*** (0.0045) 0.081** (0.033) 0.0268 *** (0.0065) 0.0028 (0.0241)
SHAWAGESP -1.142*** (0.4099) -1.926*** (0.569) -3.922*** (0.4755) -4.306*** (0.4986)
AGESP -0.0117* (0.0090) -0.013 (0.0134) 0.0767** (0.0346) 0.0837** (0.0370)
AGESP2 - - - - -0.0013* (0.0007) -0.0015** (0.0007)
EDUCSP 0.233** (0.1007) 0.394*** (0.117)
Household and Farm Characteristics
SHADOW INCOME -0.291** (0.1270) -0.325*** (0.187) -0.0835 (0.1818) -0.156 (0.1971)
HHSIZE 0.0469 (0.0608) 0.124** (0.072) -0.0355 (0.0566) -0.0285 (0.0600)
CHILD=< 5 -0.123 (0.1909) -0.741*** (0.247) -0.2678 (0.1973) -0.364* (0.2135)
REMITTANCES 0.00021 (0.0002) 0.0004 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0002) -0.0002* (0.0002)
LIVT_ASSET -0.000012 (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0002) -0.00002 (0.0000) -0.00007** (0.0000)
Young and Adult Children Working
Son
SonFARM 5 - 15 -0.619*** (0.2416) -0.682** (0.314) -0.0006 (0.2051) -0.104 (0.2126)
SonFARM 15 - 22 0.0633 (0.2063) -0.015 (0.276) -0.2954 (0.2095) -0.355* (0.2273)
SonFARM 22 - 31 -0.323 (0.2445) -0.380 (0.343) 0.2521 (0.3374) 0.178 (0.3399)
SoffFARM 5 - 15 1.142*** (0.3013) 1.134*** (0.384) 0.0795 (0.3216) 0.095 (0.3438)
SoffFARM 15 - 22 0.302 (0.3916) 1.48*** (0.471) 0.4357 (0.3375) 0.415 (0.3613)
SoffFARM 22 - 31 0.0617 (0.4619) -0.0422 (0.651) 0.699 (0.7860) 0.969 (0.8396)
Daughter
DonFARM 5 - 15 -0.3502 (0.2666) -0.757** (0.339) -0.077 (0.2457) 0.0415 (0.2512)
DonFARM 15 - 22 0.9716** (0.4496) 0.764* (0.491) -0.4713 (0.7095) -0.741 (0.6715)
DonFARM 22 - 31 -2.987 (0.5015) -2.932*** (0.538) 0.396 (0.4830) 0.203 (0.5438)
DoffFARM 5 - 15 1.063*** (0.3275) 0.492* (0.329) 0.4539* (0.2758) 0.608** (0.2620)
DoffFARM 15 - 22 0.733** (0.2982) 0.896** (0.322) 0.1352 (0.3370) 0.504 (0.3068)
DoffFARM 22 - 31 0.666 (0.5126) 0.253 (0.458) 0.58** (0.4021) 1.02** (0.4085)
CONSTANT -0.222 (0.1502) -0.3285* (0.193) 0.3165 (0.1677) 0.374** (0.1701)
N 211 211 271 271
F 65.88** 20.12*** 9.22*** 8.79***
R2 0.67 0.41 0.52 0.48
Hausman Test (Chi2(25)) 4.97 3.38 8.52 13.81
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
aStandard Errors in parenthesis23
Table 7 Test of the Equality of Estimated Marginal Product and Market Wages for Heads and 
Spouses:  Kyriazidou Es timates. 








WAGEOFF -.00068 .00165 .0122 -.00114
(0.00013)   (0.00126)    (0.0105) (0.0044)
CONSTANT -.00256 -.0039    1.0454 .0225
(0.0152) (0.0167) (0.271) (0.0171)
N 211 211 271 271
R






†Standard errors in parentheses
bTest under the null hypothesis: H0: α=0 and β=124
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